China-Afghanistan Ties Evolve: Economy and Security Reshape Ancient Relationship
China and Afghanistan's relationship is being reshaped by economic interests and shared terror concerns.
Quick Revision
China and Afghanistan share a long border and ancient trade routes.
China recognized the Taliban government in 2021.
Afghanistan possesses vast mineral resources.
China aims to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan.
China is concerned about the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operating from Afghanistan.
The Taliban seeks China's support in counter-terrorism efforts.
Recent terror attacks have targeted Chinese nationals in Afghanistan.
The Taliban needs foreign investment and international recognition.
Key Dates
Key Numbers
Visual Insights
China-Afghanistan Evolving Ties: Strategic Geography & Wakhan Corridor
This map illustrates the critical geographical features influencing the evolving relationship between China and Afghanistan, focusing on the Wakhan Corridor's role in China's economic ambitions (Belt and Road Initiative) and the complex security landscape involving Pakistan and various militant groups. It highlights the region's importance for trade, investment, and counter-terrorism efforts.
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The evolving relationship between China and Afghanistan represents a significant geopolitical recalibration, driven primarily by Beijing's strategic economic imperatives and pressing security concerns. China's pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, despite the regime's international isolation, underscores a clear prioritization of national interests over normative considerations. This approach contrasts sharply with Western policies that often condition engagement on human rights and democratic principles, showcasing a distinct model of foreign policy.
Beijing's primary driver is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a cornerstone of its global strategy. Extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan is not merely about immediate resource extraction, though Afghanistan's $1 trillion estimated mineral wealth is certainly an attractive prospect. It is fundamentally about creating resilient alternative trade routes, enhancing regional connectivity, and securing access to lucrative Central Asian markets, thereby diversifying supply chains away from vulnerable maritime choke points. This long-term strategic vision dictates China's willingness to engage with the de facto authorities in Kabul.
Simultaneously, China's deep-seated fear of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operating from Afghan soil remains a critical security concern. Beijing views ETIM as a direct and existential threat to its internal stability in Xinjiang province, where it has implemented stringent security measures. While the Taliban has offered assurances to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a launchpad for terror attacks, incidents like the Kabul hotel attack in December 2022, which specifically targeted Chinese nationals, highlight the persistent fragility of these security guarantees. Such events consistently test the Taliban's actual capacity and willingness to control all militant groups within its borders.
For the Taliban, China offers a vital lifeline in a period of severe international isolation. Substantial foreign investment and, crucially, a pathway to international recognition are desperately needed to stabilize Afghanistan's shattered economy and consolidate their precarious rule. China's stated policy of non-interference in internal affairs, coupled with its immense economic might, presents an attractive alternative to conditional Western aid. This dynamic allows the Taliban to project an image of selective international legitimacy and secure much-needed resources without adhering to external political or human rights demands.
India must carefully monitor these developments with a clear strategic lens. China's deepening footprint in Afghanistan, particularly through infrastructure projects and resource exploitation, could have direct implications for India's strategic space and influence in the broader Central Asian region. New Delhi's traditional ties with Afghanistan, built over decades through development aid and cultural exchanges, face significant challenges from Beijing's aggressive economic diplomacy. A nuanced and proactive strategy is therefore required, balancing India's security interests with its humanitarian concerns and exploring avenues for multilateral engagement to safeguard its regional standing.
Background Context
Historically, China and Afghanistan shared ancient trade routes like the Silk Road, but direct engagement was limited until the 21st century. China's recognition of the Taliban government in 2021 marked a significant shift in its foreign policy. The primary driver is economic, with Afghanistan's mineral resources offering investment opportunities under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China aims to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan to enhance regional connectivity and access Central Asian markets. Security concerns form the second pillar, as China is worried about the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan, which it blames for attacks in Xinjiang. The Taliban seeks China's support in counter-terrorism and expects respect for its sovereignty.
Why It Matters Now
Key Takeaways
- •China's engagement with Afghanistan is primarily driven by economic interests (BRI, mineral resources) and security concerns (ETIM).
- •The Taliban seeks economic engagement and international legitimacy from China.
- •China recognized the Taliban government in 2021, a significant foreign policy shift.
- •Recent terror attacks underscore the volatile security environment in Afghanistan.
- •The relationship involves a delicate balance between China's demands for security and the Taliban's need for investment and recognition.
- •This evolving dynamic has broad regional and international implications.
- •China largely overlooks the Taliban's human rights record in favor of pragmatic engagement.
Exam Angles
GS Paper 2: India and its neighbourhood relations, Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.
GS Paper 3: Linkages between development and spread of extremism, Role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security.
Geopolitics of South Asia and Central Asia.
India's foreign policy pragmatism.
View Detailed Summary
Summary
China and Afghanistan are strengthening their old ties because China wants to expand its big infrastructure projects and secure its borders from terrorists. Afghanistan, now run by the Taliban, needs China's money and recognition to rebuild its economy and gain international acceptance. It's a deal where China gets economic access and security, and Afghanistan gets much-needed support.
शुक्रवार की सुबह, पाकिस्तान के रक्षा मंत्री ख्वाजा आसिफ ने काबुल में पाकिस्तानी बमबारी के कुछ घंटों बाद अफगानिस्तान के तालिबान पर भारत के “एजेंट” के रूप में काम करने का आरोप लगाया। आसिफ ने X पर लिखा कि जुलाई 2021 में नाटो सेनाओं की वापसी के बाद, तालिबान ने अफगानिस्तान को "भारत की उपनिवेश" बना दिया और "आतंकवाद का निर्यात" कर रहा है, जिसके बाद उन्होंने अफगानिस्तान के साथ "खुले युद्ध" की घोषणा की। यह आरोप आसिफ द्वारा पिछले अक्टूबर में लगाए गए इसी तरह के दावों के बाद आया है, जहां उन्होंने कहा था कि भारत पाकिस्तान के साथ "कम तीव्रता वाले युद्ध" के लिए काबुल का उपयोग कर रहा है, हालांकि उन्होंने कोई सबूत पेश नहीं किया है। भारत ने, बदले में, अफगानिस्तान के क्षेत्र में पाकिस्तान के हवाई हमलों की कड़ी निंदा की, विदेश मंत्रालय के प्रवक्ता रणधीर जायसवाल ने कहा कि ये हमले रमजान के पवित्र महीने के दौरान हुए और इन्हें "पाकिस्तान की आंतरिक विफलताओं को बाहरी बनाने का एक और प्रयास" बताया।
भारत के तालिबान के साथ संबंध काफी विकसित हुए हैं। 1996 में शुरू में शत्रुतापूर्ण रुख था, जब भारत ने तालिबान को मान्यता नहीं दी और उसे पाकिस्तान की खुफिया एजेंसियों का एजेंट माना, नई दिल्ली ने 2001 में अमेरिकी नेतृत्व वाले अफगानिस्तान पर आक्रमण का समर्थन किया। भारत ने तब काबुल में अपना दूतावास फिर से खोला और 2001 से 2021 के बीच मानवीय सहायता और पुनर्निर्माण में $3 बिलियन से अधिक का निवेश किया, जिसमें 218 किमी जरंज-डेलाराम राजमार्ग (2009), सलमा बांध ($290 मिलियन, जून 2016 में पीएम नरेंद्र मोदी द्वारा उद्घाटन) और काबुल में एक नई राष्ट्रीय असेंबली भवन (दिसंबर 2015 में पीएम मोदी द्वारा उद्घाटन) जैसी परियोजनाएं शामिल थीं। अक्टूबर 2011 में करजई सरकार के साथ एक रणनीतिक साझेदारी समझौते पर हस्ताक्षर किए गए थे। हालांकि, अगस्त 2021 में तालिबान के सत्ता में लौटने के बाद, भारत ने शुरू में अपना दूतावास बंद कर दिया था।
एक साल बाद, 2022 में, जब पाकिस्तान और तालिबान के बीच तहरीक-ए-तालिबान पाकिस्तान (TTP) जैसे सशस्त्र समूहों को पनाह देने के आरोपों को लेकर संबंध बिगड़ गए, तो भारत ने तालिबान के साथ जुड़ना शुरू कर दिया। भारत ने 2022 में काबुल में अपने मिशन को चलाने के लिए "तकनीकी विशेषज्ञों" की एक टीम भेजी और अक्टूबर 2025 में आधिकारिक तौर पर अपना दूतावास फिर से खोल दिया। नई दिल्ली ने तालिबान को मुंबई और हैदराबाद के भारतीय शहरों में अफगान वाणिज्य दूतावास संचालित करने की भी अनुमति दी। उच्च स्तरीय राजनयिक बैठकें हुई हैं, जिनमें पिछले जनवरी में दुबई में तालिबान के विदेश मंत्री अमीर खान मुत्ताकी ने भारत के विदेश सचिव विक्रम मिसरी से मुलाकात की थी, और मुत्ताकी ने अक्टूबर 2025 में नई दिल्ली का दौरा कर भारतीय विदेश मंत्री सुब्रह्मण्यम जयशंकर से मुलाकात की थी। इस बैठक के बाद, दोनों पक्षों ने "निकट संचार और नियमित जुड़ाव" का संकल्प लिया। भारत ने पिछले नवंबर में आए 6.3 तीव्रता के भूकंप के बाद भोजन, दवा और टीके भेजकर मानवीय सहायता भी प्रदान की है, और दिसंबर 2025 से स्वास्थ्य सेवा अवसंरचना परियोजनाओं को मंजूरी दी है और लागू किया है।
भारत का यह व्यावहारिक दृष्टिकोण अपने पड़ोस में पाकिस्तान और चीन के प्रभाव का मुकाबला करने और अपने सुरक्षा हितों की रक्षा करने की रणनीतिक आवश्यकता से प्रेरित है, जो पाकिस्तान और अफगानिस्तान के बीच तनावपूर्ण संबंधों का लाभ उठा रहा है। पाकिस्तान, यह महसूस करते हुए कि वह अफगानिस्तान पर अपनी पकड़ खो रहा है, ने भारत पर तालिबान का समर्थन करने और TTP और बलूचिस्तान लिबरेशन आर्मी (BLA) जैसे समूहों को बढ़ावा देने का आरोप लगाया है। पाकिस्तान की ISI ने अफगानिस्तान में चीनी निवेश को बाधित करने के भी प्रयास किए हैं, विशेष रूप से वाखान कॉरिडोर में, जो चीन, पाकिस्तान और ताजिकिस्तान की सीमा से लगा एक संकरा क्षेत्र है। ISI कथित तौर पर इस्लामिक स्टेट खुरासान प्रांत (ISKP) के आतंकवादियों का उपयोग करके चीनी हितों को नुकसान पहुंचाने और अफगानिस्तान को पाकिस्तान को दरकिनार करते हुए चीन के लिए सीधा व्यापार मार्ग बनने से रोकने के लिए बड़े पैमाने पर हमलों की साजिश रच रही है। चीन ने, बदले में, पाकिस्तान पर अविश्वास बढ़ा दिया है, अमेरिका के साथ एक खनिज समझौते के बाद उसके इरादों पर सवाल उठाया है और उस पर सीपीईसी परियोजना 2.0 निवेश की सुरक्षा में विफल रहने का आरोप लगाया है, जिससे बीजिंग को सीधे अफगानिस्तान के साथ संबंध खोलने पड़े हैं।
भारत का तालिबान के तहत अफगानिस्तान के साथ विकसित होता जुड़ाव, वैचारिक मतभेदों के बावजूद, क्षेत्रीय स्थिरता बनाए रखने, अपने निवेशों की रक्षा करने और प्रतिद्वंद्वी प्रभावों का मुकाबला करने के लिए एक रणनीतिक अनिवार्यता को दर्शाता है। यह विषय UPSC मुख्य परीक्षा के GS पेपर 2 (अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संबंध) और GS पेपर 3 (सुरक्षा और अर्थव्यवस्था) के लिए अत्यधिक प्रासंगिक है।
Background
Latest Developments
Sources & Further Reading
Frequently Asked Questions
1. Why is the Wakhan Corridor geographically significant for China's interests in Afghanistan, and what's a common Prelims trap related to it?
The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of land in northeastern Afghanistan that extends to China. It is crucial for China because it provides the only direct land border between the two countries, facilitating ancient trade routes and potentially serving as a future extension for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. This direct access is vital for China's economic and strategic outreach in Central Asia.
Exam Tip
Remember that the Wakhan Corridor connects Afghanistan to China, not Pakistan or Tajikistan directly in terms of a shared border. A common trap is to confuse its connectivity with other neighboring countries. It's the *only* direct land border with China.
2. What is the estimated value of Afghanistan's mineral resources, and how does China's interest in them relate to its broader initiatives like BRI?
Afghanistan possesses vast mineral resources estimated to be worth $1 trillion. China's interest in these resources is a key driver of its engagement with Afghanistan. This aligns with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which seeks to secure resources and expand its economic influence globally through infrastructure development and trade routes. Access to these minerals would fuel China's industrial needs and enhance its strategic resource security.
3. UPSC often tests specific dates. Why was China's recognition of the Taliban government in 2021 a significant diplomatic move, and what could be a related MCQ trap?
China's recognition of the Taliban government in 2021 was significant because it made China one of the first major global powers to formally acknowledge the Taliban's rule after the NATO withdrawal. This move signaled China's pragmatic approach to securing its economic and security interests in Afghanistan, prioritizing stability and resource access over ideological alignment. A common MCQ trap could be confusing the year of recognition with the year of the Kabul hotel attack (December 2022) or the initiation of BRI (2013).
4. Why did China choose to recognize the Taliban government in 2021, unlike many other major powers, and what were its primary motivations?
China recognized the Taliban government in 2021 primarily due to pragmatic geopolitical and economic considerations. Unlike many Western powers, China prioritized stability in its bordering region and access to Afghanistan's vast mineral resources. Its motivations included: ensuring border security against groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), protecting its investments, and potentially extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan.
5. What is the primary difference in how China and India have approached the Taliban regime in Afghanistan since 2021, considering India's initial non-recognition?
The primary difference lies in their initial recognition and subsequent engagement. China swiftly recognized the Taliban in 2021, driven by its economic interests (minerals, CPEC extension) and security concerns (ETIM). India, on the other hand, initially closed its embassy and maintained a policy of non-recognition, reflecting its historical stance and concerns about terrorism. However, India later adopted a pragmatic shift in 2022, re-engaging with Afghanistan, especially as Pakistan-Taliban relations deteriorated.
6. How does China's concern about the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan directly influence its security and economic interests, especially regarding CPEC?
China's concern about ETIM is a critical security driver. ETIM is a militant group that China views as a threat to its western Xinjiang region. If ETIM operates from Afghanistan, it poses a direct security risk to China's border and its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The stability of Afghanistan is crucial for the security of CPEC infrastructure and personnel, making ETIM's presence a significant impediment to China's economic and strategic goals in the region.
7. Given Pakistan's accusations against the Taliban and India's re-engagement, what are India's strategic options to navigate its relationship with Afghanistan and counter regional instability?
India has several strategic options to navigate its relationship with Afghanistan and counter regional instability. These include:
- •Continued pragmatic engagement: Maintaining diplomatic presence and humanitarian aid to build goodwill and influence.
- •Leveraging Pakistan-Taliban friction: Utilizing the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the Taliban (over TTP and refugees) to enhance its own standing and influence.
- •Focus on economic and development projects: Investing in projects that benefit the Afghan people directly, thereby countering China's resource-driven approach and Pakistan's security-centric narrative.
- •Regional cooperation: Exploring partnerships with other regional powers (excluding Pakistan) that share concerns about stability and terrorism in Afghanistan.
- •Counter-terrorism intelligence sharing: Engaging with the Taliban on counter-terrorism, particularly concerning groups like ISKP, to ensure regional security.
Exam Tip
When discussing India's options, always present a balanced view with both diplomatic and security dimensions. Avoid taking an extreme stance and focus on pragmatic, multi-faceted approaches.
8. How would you explain the 'ancient relationship' between China and Afghanistan in an interview, beyond just modern economic and security concerns?
The 'ancient relationship' between China and Afghanistan primarily refers to their historical connections through the Silk Road. For centuries, Afghanistan served as a crucial crossroads for trade, culture, and ideas between China, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The Wakhan Corridor, in particular, was a key artery of this ancient network. This historical context suggests a long-standing understanding of each other's strategic importance, even if direct political ties varied over time. It's a relationship rooted in geographical proximity and shared trade routes, predating modern geopolitical alignments.
9. How do the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the Taliban, particularly over issues like TTP, create both opportunities and challenges for India's re-engagement with Afghanistan?
The deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the Taliban present a complex scenario for India. There are both opportunities and challenges:
- •Opportunities: It creates a diplomatic opening for India to increase its influence in Afghanistan, as the Taliban may seek alternative partners. India can leverage its historical goodwill and development projects without the shadow of Pakistan's influence. It also reduces the likelihood of a Pakistan-Taliban nexus against India.
- •Challenges: The instability caused by Pakistan's actions (like airstrikes) could further destabilize Afghanistan, potentially leading to a rise in terror groups like ISKP, which could pose a threat to India's interests. It also complicates regional security dynamics and could make humanitarian aid delivery more difficult.
Exam Tip
When analyzing such situations, always consider both the positive (opportunities) and negative (challenges) aspects. Avoid a one-sided argument. Mention specific groups like TTP and ISKP to show depth of understanding.
10. What specific developments should an aspirant monitor in the coming months to understand the evolving China-Afghanistan relationship and its regional implications?
To understand the evolving China-Afghanistan relationship and its regional implications, aspirants should monitor several key developments:
- •Progress on CPEC extension: Any concrete steps or announcements regarding the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan.
- •Mineral resource agreements: New contracts or progress on existing deals for the extraction of Afghanistan's mineral wealth by Chinese companies.
- •Security cooperation against ETIM: Any joint statements or actions by China and the Taliban specifically targeting the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
- •Taliban's foreign policy shifts: Changes in the Taliban's engagement with other regional powers, especially India and Pakistan.
- •Internal stability in Afghanistan: The Taliban's ability to maintain control and prevent the resurgence of other terror groups like ISKP, which impacts China's security concerns.
Exam Tip
Focus on tangible actions (agreements, projects, joint operations) rather than just rhetoric. Look for patterns in diplomatic visits and economic investments as indicators of evolving ties.
Practice Questions (MCQs)
1. Consider the following statements regarding India's engagement with Afghanistan under the Taliban: 1. India initially adopted a hostile policy towards the Taliban when they first rose to power in 1996 and did not recognize their administration. 2. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, India immediately reopened its embassy in Kabul and officially recognized the Taliban government. 3. India has provided humanitarian support to Afghanistan, including food, medicine, and vaccines, following a 6.3 magnitude earthquake in November last year. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- A.1 only
- B.1 and 3 only
- C.2 and 3 only
- D.1, 2 and 3
Show Answer
Answer: B
Statement 1 is CORRECT: When the Taliban first rose to power in Afghanistan in 1996, India adopted a hostile policy towards the group and did not recognise its assumption of power. India also shunned all diplomatic relations with the Taliban. Statement 2 is INCORRECT: In 2021, after the Taliban returned to power, India closed its embassy in Afghanistan once again and also did not officially recognise the Taliban as the government of the country. It only sent a team of "technical experts" in 2022 and officially reopened its embassy in October 2025, but still did not officially recognize the government. Statement 3 is CORRECT: After a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck northern Afghanistan in November last year, India shipped food, medicine and vaccines.
2. In the context of recent developments in Afghanistan, consider the following statements about the Wakhan Corridor: 1. The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip in northeastern Afghanistan that shares borders with China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. 2. China views the Wakhan Corridor as a potential direct trade route to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. 3. Pakistan's ISI is reportedly plotting to use Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists to disrupt Chinese investments in this corridor. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- A.1 only
- B.1 and 2 only
- C.2 and 3 only
- D.1, 2 and 3
Show Answer
Answer: B
Statement 1 is CORRECT: The Wakhan Corridor is indeed a narrow strip in northeastern Afghanistan that shares borders with China to the east, Pakistan to the south, and Tajikistan to the north. Statement 2 is CORRECT: China has been looking at this corridor for some time as it could open up connectivity to Afghanistan, allowing both China and Afghanistan to indulge in trade, potentially bypassing Pakistan as the main transit point. Statement 3 is INCORRECT: The source states that Pakistan's ISI plans to use terrorists of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), not Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to strike at the Wakhan Corridor to damage Chinese interests. The ISKP is described as backing Pakistan in its fight against the BLA and TTP, and would agree to hurt the Taliban regime.
3. Match the following projects/agreements with the respective years of their inauguration/signing or significant development: List-I (Project/Agreement) I. Zaranj-Delaram highway II. Salma Dam III. Strategic Partnership Agreement between India and Afghanistan IV. Chabahar Port trilateral agreement List-II (Year) 1. 2009 2. 2011 3. 2016 4. 2015 Select the correct match:
- A.I-1, II-3, III-2, IV-3
- B.I-1, II-4, III-2, IV-3
- C.I-2, II-3, III-1, IV-4
- D.I-4, II-1, III-3, IV-2
Show Answer
Answer: A
I. Zaranj-Delaram highway: India's Border Road Organisation (BRO) assisted Afghanistan in the development of this 218km highway in 2009 under Karzai’s government. (Matches 1) II. Salma Dam: This $290m dam project was inaugurated in June 2016 when PM Modi visited Afghanistan. (Matches 3) III. Strategic Partnership Agreement between India and Afghanistan: In October 2011, under Karzai, India and Afghanistan renewed ties by signing an agreement to form a strategic partnership. (Matches 2) IV. Chabahar Port trilateral agreement: In May 2016, Iran, India and Afghanistan signed a trilateral trade and transit agreement on the Chabahar port. (Matches 3) Therefore, the correct matching is I-1, II-3, III-2, IV-3.
4. Assertion (A): India has adopted a pragmatic approach towards the Taliban administration in Afghanistan since 2022. Reason (R): This pragmatic approach is partly driven by the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the Taliban, which India leverages to counter its strategic rivals. A) Both A and R are true and R is the correct explanation of A. B) Both A and R are true but R is not the correct explanation of A. C) A is true but R is false. D) A is false but R is true.
- A.Both A and R are true and R is the correct explanation of A.
- B.Both A and R are true but R is not the correct explanation of A.
- C.A is true but R is false.
- D.A is false but R is true.
Show Answer
Answer: A
Assertion (A) is true: In 2022, as relations between Pakistan and the Taliban deteriorated, India began engaging with the Taliban, sending "technical experts" and reopening its embassy, demonstrating a pragmatic shift from its earlier hostile stance. Reason (R) is true: The source explicitly states that India has ultimately taken a pragmatic approach to the Taliban in order to maintain good relations and has "somewhat leveraged poor relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan to cement these." It further adds that "the strategic necessity to counter Pakistan has led it to engage with the Taliban proactively." This directly explains India's pragmatic approach. Therefore, both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
Source Articles
Expert Explains: As Pakistan again points fingers at Afghanistan over terror, a look at Kabul-Beijing ties | Explained News - The Indian Express
Pak asks Afghanistan to hand over TTP terrorists involved in attack on Chinese workers | World News - The Indian Express
About the Author
Anshul MannGeopolitics & International Affairs Analyst
Anshul Mann writes about International Relations at GKSolver, breaking down complex developments into clear, exam-relevant analysis.
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