parliamentary confidence

The most common trap is confusing a 'vote of no confidence' with other motions like a 'censure motion' or 'adjournment motion'. A vote of no confidence, if passed, *requires* the government to resign. Censure motions, even if passed, do not automatically trigger a resignation. Examiners will present scenarios where a censure motion is passed and ask if the government *must* resign – the answer is no.

Parliamentary confidence ensures the government remains accountable to the elected legislature. Without it, a government could theoretically continue ruling even if it loses the support of the people's representatives. It prevents a situation where a government becomes autocratic or disregards the will of the legislature. It solves the problem of potential executive overreach and ensures democratic legitimacy.

Parliamentary confidence primarily focuses on the *lower* house of parliament (Lok Sabha in India). It doesn't directly address the confidence of the *upper* house (Rajya Sabha). Critics argue this can lead to situations where a government with a majority in the Lok Sabha can still face obstruction in the Rajya Sabha, potentially paralyzing legislative action. Also, the anti-defection law, while intended to prevent instability, can be seen as limiting the ability of individual MPs to vote according to their conscience, thus affecting the true expression of confidence.

In practice, parliamentary confidence is often tested during the budget approval process. If a government fails to get its budget passed in the Lok Sabha, it's a clear indication it has lost the confidence of the house. For example, if a hypothetical government's Finance Bill is defeated on the floor, it would almost certainly lead to its resignation. The government could also proactively seek a vote of confidence if it feels its majority is threatened, as a show of strength.

The 2018 no-confidence motion against the Narendra Modi government, while unsuccessful, highlighted the process. The opposition brought the motion citing various failures of the government. The debate itself allowed for scrutiny of the government's policies and performance, even though the government ultimately won the vote comfortably. The controversy lay in the opposition's claim that they were using the motion to expose the government's shortcomings before the upcoming general election, rather than genuinely expecting to topple the government.

Without parliamentary confidence, governments could potentially become less responsive to public opinion and the needs of the electorate. They could pursue policies that are unpopular or even detrimental to the public interest, without fear of being removed from power. Ordinary citizens would have fewer avenues to hold their government accountable between elections, potentially leading to increased corruption and abuse of power.

Critics argue that the constant threat of a no-confidence motion can lead to political instability and hinder the government's ability to make long-term policy decisions. Governments may become overly focused on maintaining their majority, leading to short-term, populist measures rather than addressing complex, long-term challenges. Response: While the risk of instability exists, it's a necessary trade-off for ensuring accountability. The possibility of losing a confidence vote forces governments to be more responsive to the needs and concerns of the legislature and, by extension, the people. Mechanisms like fixed-term parliaments (though not in India) can mitigate some of the instability.

Several reforms could be considered: answerPoints: * Strengthening the role of parliamentary committees to provide more effective scrutiny of government actions and policies, reducing the reliance on no-confidence motions as the primary tool for accountability. * Introducing mechanisms to promote greater stability in coalition governments, such as pre-election agreements on key policy priorities. * Reforming the anti-defection law to balance the need for party discipline with the individual MP's right to represent their constituents' views. * Increasing transparency and access to information to enable citizens to better hold their representatives accountable.

Compared to the UK, India's system is arguably more prone to instability due to the greater prevalence of coalition governments and the more fluid nature of party allegiances. In contrast, countries like Germany have constitutional mechanisms to promote coalition stability, such as constructive votes of no confidence (where a new government must be proposed simultaneously with the no-confidence vote). India's Speaker also has significant power in admitting a no-confidence motion, which can be a point of contention. However, India's system is relatively straightforward, lacking the complexities of some European systems with multiple layers of confidence procedures.

The most important aspect is Article 75(3), which explicitly states that the Council of Ministers is *collectively responsible* to the Lok Sabha. This is the constitutional basis for the concept of parliamentary confidence. Examiners often test whether this responsibility is to the President, the Parliament as a whole, or specifically the Lok Sabha. The correct answer is the Lok Sabha.

Parliamentary confidence is the *mechanism* by which collective responsibility is *enforced*. Collective responsibility is the *principle*; parliamentary confidence is the *process*.

The Brexit process vividly illustrated how difficult it can be for a government to maintain parliamentary confidence when faced with deep divisions within its own party and the legislature as a whole. Theresa May's repeated failures to get her Brexit deal through parliament, despite surviving a no-confidence vote, demonstrate that simply surviving a confidence vote doesn't guarantee effective governance. It highlights the practical limitations of parliamentary confidence in highly polarized political environments.