Article 25 of the Indian Constitution

The most common trick is to present scenarios where 'public order' or 'morality' are vaguely defined. Examiners will create situations where it's unclear if a religious practice genuinely threatens public order, then ask if the government's restriction is valid under Article 25. The key is to remember that restrictions must be 'reasonable' and based on actual, demonstrable threats, not just hypothetical ones.

Professing religion means openly declaring your faith, while propagating religion means explaining your faith to others, without coercion, to potentially convince them.

Students confuse them because both allow state intervention in religious matters. Article 25(2)(a) allows the state to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice (like financial mismanagement in a temple). Article 25(2)(b) allows the state to legislate for social welfare and reform, even if it impacts religious practices (like abolishing untouchability, even if some defend it religiously).

Freedom of conscience means you can hold any belief (or no belief) you choose, without state interference. Freedom of religion is the right to practice and propagate that belief. For example, a person might have the freedom of conscience to disbelieve in all religions (atheism), and Article 25 protects that. They then have the freedom to not participate in any religious activity. The difference is that conscience is about inner belief, while religion is about outward expression and practice.

answerPoints: * Public Order: Restrictions on religious processions that historically led to communal clashes. * Morality: Laws prohibiting bigamy, even if allowed by a religion. * Health: Regulations on animal sacrifice during religious festivals to prevent the spread of disease.

The Sabarimala case highlighted the tension between religious freedom and gender equality. The Supreme Court ruled that the ban on women of menstruating age entering the temple violated their fundamental rights, including Article 25. The court emphasized that religious practices must not be discriminatory and must adhere to constitutional values. This broadened the interpretation of Article 25 by factoring in principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Critics argue that Article 25 is often interpreted in a way that prioritizes religious freedom over other fundamental rights, leading to the perpetuation of discriminatory practices in the name of religion. They point to cases where harmful customs are defended as 'essential religious practices.' A counter-argument is that Article 25(2)(b) allows the state to legislate for social reform, providing a mechanism to address such issues. However, the implementation of this provision is often slow and faces resistance from religious groups, requiring a balanced approach that respects both religious freedom and social justice.

Compared to some secular democracies like France, which have a stricter separation of religion and state, India's Article 25 takes a more accommodative approach, allowing for the public expression of religious beliefs while also permitting state intervention for social reform. This is favorable in a diverse country like India. However, this also leads to more legal challenges and debates about the limits of religious freedom compared to countries with clearer, stricter secular laws.

The core argument is that these laws violate Article 25 by creating a climate of fear and suspicion around religious conversions, even those done out of free will. Critics argue that they place an undue burden on individuals to prove that a conversion was not forced or fraudulent, effectively infringing on their right to choose their religion freely. The laws are seen as potentially targeting interfaith couples and minority communities.

Without Article 25, ordinary citizens would lack constitutional protection for their religious practices and beliefs. The state could potentially interfere with religious rituals, dictate religious practices, or discriminate against individuals based on their faith without facing constitutional challenges. Minorities would be particularly vulnerable, as their religious practices might not be tolerated or protected.

This phrase means that the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 is not absolute and is subject to other fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. This includes the right to equality (Article 14), the prohibition of discrimination (Article 15), and the protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21). This ensures that religious freedom is balanced with other essential rights and cannot be used to justify practices that violate these rights.

This law could be challenged on the grounds that it unduly restricts the right to manage religious affairs. While Article 25(2)(a) allows the state to regulate economic activities associated with religious practice, the challenge would argue that the registration and reporting requirements are excessively burdensome and interfere with the autonomy of religious institutions. The petitioners would need to demonstrate that the regulations are not reasonable and proportionate to the stated objective (e.g., preventing financial mismanagement).